Relators frequently bring qui tam cases based in large part on allegations that a defendant violated some obscure government regulation. These alleged regulatory violations become the basis for a False Claim Act qui tam when the defendant "certifies" to the government its compliance with regulations in conjunction with submitting a request for payment to the government. Yet, what if the underlying regulations were ambiguous, unclear, or simply had not been previously applied in the manner urged by the relators? Can the alleged violation of such ambiguous regulations give rise to a False Claims Act case? More often, courts are answering "no" and refusing to permit the False Claims Act to be used to police violations of unclear or ambiguous regulations.
A good example can be found in the recent Third Circuit case, U.S. Department of Transportation ex rel Arnold v. CMC Engineering, Inc., et al., __ Fed. Appx.__, 2014 WL 2442945 (3rd Cir. June 2, 2014). In this qui tam case, the Third Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the defendant could not have "knowingly" submitted a false claim because the contractual terms it allegedly violated were so ambigious that no reasonable jury could have found a knowing violation.
In CMC Engineering, the defendant was a contractor who provided inspection services to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") in support of federally funded highway projects. PennDOT contracted with the defendant for several different classes of inspectors, and the PennDOT contract set forth different credential and experience requirements for the inspectors. The relator, a construction engineer for PennDOT, alleged that CMC's inspectors who worked on the project did not have the contractual qualifications that entitled CMC to the pay rates it billed to PennDOT which were ultimately paid by the federal government. The relator contended that defendant "submitted factually and legally false claims by knowingly requesting payments at certain rates for inspectors it knew did not meet credentialing requirements." As to what the acceptable credentials were for the inspectors, the relator argued that those were set forth in the only "reasonable" interpretation of the CMC's contract with PennDOT.
The Court found, however, that the "language of the contracts . . . undermines [relator's] assertion that the contract is susceptible to only one reading" and that "the contracts themselves are ambiguous concerning the credentials required for particular positions that justify particular pay rates." The Court noted further that PennDOT employees acknowledged that the contract terms were "open to interpretation" and that PennDOT had subsequently taken steps to make them clearer. "As a result of this ambiguity," the Court observed, "there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find CMC 'knowingly' made a factually false claim or false certification . . . by requesting reimbursement for inspectors at rates for which [the relator] contends they were unqualified."
In short, given that many government regulations are often as clear as mud, cases like CMC Engineering represent a welcome trend among courts who are skeptical of relators who try to use the False Claims Act either to police technical regulatory violations or to enforce ambiguous and unclear government regulations.
A. Brian Albritton
June 25, 2014
Showing posts with label contract interpretation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label contract interpretation. Show all posts
Wednesday, June 25, 2014
Sunday, February 12, 2012
Contract Interpretation and False Claims Act Cases: Applying the Contra Proferentem Doctrine to the Government
Having an ambiguous contract with the government can give rise to a to False Claims Act allegations -- that is what the Chapman Law Firm discovered when it sought to sue the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for failing to perform a contract the firm had with HUD “for the management and marketing of single family homes in Ohio and Michigan.” See Chapman Law Firm v. United States, No. 09-891C,2012 WL 256090 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 18, 2012). The government responded to the suit alleging that Chapman had violated the False Claims Act by using unlicensed pest inspectors to perform termite inspections instead of “licensed” inspectors as the contract allegedly required. The government sought summary judgment against Chapman on the grounds that the contract called for licensed inspectors; Chapman defended, claiming that the contract was ambiguous and should be construed against the government. The U.S. Court of Claims denied the government’s summary judgment motion, applied the legal doctrine of contra proferentem, and construed the contractual ambiguity against the government.
I commend to you the “Fraud Alert” by John Boese and Douglas Baruch of Fried Frank which discusses the Chapman case and the significance of the Court’s application of the contra proferentem doctrine in a False Claims Act case: CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT: Court Applies Contra Proferentem Doctrine Against the Government in an FCA Case Based on An Ambiguous Contract Provision. The authors explain that the contra proferentem doctrine is a rule of contract interpretation often applied in insurance contracts and to other commercial contexts, but until Chapman, the rule had not been applied in an False Claims Act ("FCA") case. Based on the principal that “a party that drafts and imposes an ambiguous term should not benefit from that ambiguity,” they explain that the rule provides that “a latent ambiguity in a contract provision to be construed against the party that drafted the [ambiguous] provision.”
The authors point out that the contra proferentem doctrine can be “be significant in a broad spectrum of FCA cases” as so many of such cases are based on allegations that the defendant violated “requirements incorporated into government grants, contracts, and regulations.” For example, the authors cite to the FCA cases where defendants are accused of falsely certifying their compliance with the myriad of contractual requirements frequently found in government contracts. See 11/30/11 blog entry on “implied false certification.” “These requirements,” they explain, “are drafted by the government, and where they are ambiguous or capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, the rule that ambiguous requirements are construed against the drafter places the burden on the government to draft clear requirements, which is where that burden belongs.” The authors further observe that a defendant’s “reasonable interpretation” of an ambiguous contract with the government can further support a defendant’s claim that they acted in “good faith” and did not have the requisite intent for FCA liability.
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